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The credit derivatives market has grown dramatically in the last three years and with that 
growth has come new opportunities for financial institutions to take advantage of this 
market.  In this paper, we explore these market developments and lay a conceptual 
framework for the strategic management of credit derivatives by banking institutions.  We 
argue that the development of the market now means that banks need to choose a strategic 
path for their credit derivative operations, and more specifically whether they will use the 
instruments simply as a tool for portfolio management, or participate in the market as a 
market-maker.   
 
 
The study of credit risk has gained rapidly in importance in recent years, mainly due to the 
emergence of the credit derivative market.  Most of the research and analysis has been focused 
on the pricing of credit risk and or credit derivatives, while little attention has been given in the 
academic literature to the structural implications of the developing credit derivative market.  
Furthermore, even less attention has been paid to the managerial issues that arise with the 
development of this still relatively new market that has the potential to radically change the 
allocation, pricing, regulation and management of credit risk.  In this paper we attempt to start a 
dialogue on the management issues of credit derivatives and to lay a conceptual framework for 
studying the issues.  The central conclusion is that a banking institution needs to determine the 
depth and extent of its operations and more fundamentally determine whether as an institution it 
will be utilizing the credit derivatives market as an end-user for credit management or as a 
market maker intending to make a profit from trading and servicing clients. 
Section one gives a brief overview of credit derivatives.  The second section describes the 
features of this market as it concerns banking as an industry, while section three discusses some 
of the managerial implications.  The fourth and final section concludes and provides some 
directions for further research and analysis. 
 
 
I    Introduction 
 
A credit derivative is a financial contract where the cash flows between the trade counterparties 
depend on the credit quality of an underlying reference asset or series of reference assets.  The 
most prevalent and basic form of a credit derivative is the credit default swap (CDS). Other 
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common types of credit derivatives include Total Rate of Return Swaps, Credit Linked Notes, 
and structured credit derivatives known as Collateralized Debt Obligations.  More recently there 
has been the development of a liquid market in Credit Spread Options and Credit Default Swap 
Options.  More detailed descriptions of credit derivatives can be found in (Choudhry 2004). 
 
The growth of the credit derivative market has been spectacular in the last three years.  While 
still much smaller than the interest rate swap market, current estimates of the market size range 
from $4 – 6B with the market size expected to be over $8B by 2006 (BIS 2003).  Recent data 
from the Quarterly Derivative Reports from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC 
2005) show that the growth of the market is still exponential and that credit derivatives are still 
the fastest growing aspect of the over the counter derivatives market.   
 
Reasons for the growth in the last few years are many, but most agree that the growth surge has 
been due to a couple of key factors.  To begin, the credit derivative market survived a period of 
some spectacular defaults with minimal market unease or disruption.  A relatively minor number 
of legal disputes arose from these transactions, providing new participants more comfort on 
entering into the market.  As market liquidity and transparency has grown, more participants 
have entered the market, and existing participants have been encouraged to transact more often, 
which in turn leads to even more transacting and transparency.    
 
As (Kao, 2000) points out, the rise of the credit derivative market has precipitated a dramatic 
increase in the academic research into the pricing of credit risk, which in turn has led to practical 
implications in the financial industry that has made pricing more efficient and pricing models 
and software more widely available.  Related to the increased awareness of pricing models is the 
acceptance by the investing community of credit as an asset class.  As credit derivative products 
and knowledge of these products have developed, more institutional investors such as insurance 
companies and hedge funds have entered into the market (Fitch, 2004a).   
 
However, we conjecture that the credit derivative market is still far from maturity and is likely to 
continue its dramatic growth.  Besides a continuation of the factors already mentioned, a key 
driver for growth over the next several years is likely to be the credit risk modeling aspects that 
will be allowed for the setting of regulatory capital levels of banking institutions under the new 
Basel II guidelines that are scheduled to take effect in 2008.  Credit derivatives allow for a great 
deal of flexibility for trading credit risks and thus allowing bank credit portfolio managers to 
customize their portfolios to a specific risk appetite or view on the markets.  As (Reid, 2005) 
states, “altering credit-risk exposure through the use of a CDS can be more cost effective than 
transacting in the secondary market.  As a result, the use of CDSs is becoming a universal 
mainstay of portfolio management.”  The implication is that a bank ignores credit derivatives at 
its strategic peril. 
 
The growth of the credit derivative market however has not been without issues.  (Ali and 
Robbe, 2005; and Cocco, 2002) provide an overview of some of the legal and documentation 
issues that have hindered the market in the early stages.  In particular, Ali and Robbe highlight 
that the development of the market may be outstripping the ability of the legal documentation to 
keep up.  
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A related issue is that of regulation.  Early in the development of the market, regulation was a 
major concern as different regulatory bodies either issued inconsistent guidelines, or worse, 
issued guidelines on a case by case basis.  The regulatory uncertainty undoubtedly hindered the 
development of the market and either slowed down or kept many participants on the sidelines as 
they were wary about taking on additional regulatory risks.   
 
II    Credit Derivatives and the Implications for the Financial System 
 
With the relative maturing of the market, attention has now started to focus on the role of credit 
derivatives in the broader financial system and in particular on whether credit derivatives are a 
blessing or a curse for the markets in general.  This research has taken three broad paths; (1) 
analysis of whether or not credit derivatives add or subtract to the general stability of the 
financial system, (2) the long term legal and regulatory issues, and (3) the effect of credit 
derivatives on the stability of the credit markets in particular.  Across all of these issues is the 
central question of whether the existence of credit derivatives has increased or decreased 
financial risk.  At first blush one would think that credit derivatives would help to complete the 
market for credit and as such the overall level of risk would be diminished.  Additionally, credit 
derivatives allow for new entrants into the market for credit risk, and provide an easy means to 
transfer the credit risk and thus provide a mechanism for risk-sharing across a much broader 
spectrum of participants.  However, several arguments have been put forward that may mitigate 
or override these positive effects of the market. 
 
(Kiff, 2003) provides an extensive list of concerns that arise from the development of credit 
derivatives.  Among the issues raised by Kiff are the lack of transparency, complexity of the 
pricing, the increased importance of the rating agencies, the market concentration amongst a few 
market makers, market effects on the cash markets for credit, bank incentives for bad behavior, 
basis risk, pricing risk and legal risk.    
 
The concentration of credit risk amongst the major dealers is also a concern that has been voiced 
by not only market participants but market regulators as well.  According to (OCC 2005), the 
percentage of concentration of the US based credit derivative market that is controlled by the top 
five banks is 96% of the market.  Indeed, the largest bank in terms of credit derivatives, (J.P. 
Morgan Chase and Co.), accounted for 41% of the market by itself.  However this was down 
significantly from its share just a year earlier (OCC 2004) when J.P. Morgan and Chase Co.’s 
share of the market was 56%.   
 
In an overview of the financial markets, the (IMF, 2005) expressed concern that the credit 
derivative market may not have enough liquidity to afford an orderly settlement of contracts 
should a default crisis occurs.  (Fitch, 2004b) as well has raised concerns about the overall 
liquidity of the market and the ability of the market to cope with a serious downturn.  Fitch in 
particular has noted an absence of market makers when the quality of a specific credit begins to 
deteriorate.    
 
(Batten and Hogan, 2002) review many of the legal issues of credit derivatives that may add to 
instability of the financial system.  In particular they are concerned about the enforceability of 
the instruments.  Among the issues that they raise are the practicalities of defining a credit event, 
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consistency between contracts, terminations based upon downgrades, physical settlement of 
contracts and the issue of affiliates of the reference asset suffering a credit event.   
 
(Kiff, Michaud and Mitchell, 2002; Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Morrison, 2005; and Arping, 2002) 
are amongst a large body of research that is calling into question the desirability of credit 
derivatives in terms of credit market stability.  The essential arguments that run throughout these 
articles is that while credit derivatives certainly provides risk sharing and diversification, the 
actions of banks in managing their positions may outweigh the benefits for the market as a 
whole.  The major issues are a moral hazard, disintermediation, lack of monitoring incentives 
and an adverse selection problem.  As banks offload their credit risks, they may be less diligent 
in their selection of clients to which they grant credit and furthermore they may be less inclined 
to properly monitor the credits.  Furthermore, there is an incentive for them to shed the risks that 
they may have an informational advantage on and for which they may have better information 
than the market about the seriousness of the entity’s credit situation.  This lemons problem may 
thus increase the cost of credit as whole across the market.   
 
(Wagner, 2004; and Instefjord, 2005) argue that the presence of the credit derivative market may 
provide flexibility and incentives to financial institutions to grant more credit to less credit 
worthy entities than they would otherwise and thus increase the overall level of credit risk, 
overriding the positive risk-sharing aspects of the credit derivatives market. 
 
These arguments however do not fully integrate the arguments that a larger number of 
participants in the market, (for example the insurance funds and hedge funds), increase the 
overall level of analysis, thus increasing the overall level of market efficiency and monitoring.  
In essence, the above arguments are of a bank’s informational advantage versus the market as a 
whole.   
 
A major driver of the credit derivative market in the future will be the implementation of the 
Basle II regulatory capital guidelines (BIS 2004).  These new regulatory guidelines will allow 
banks to calculate their regulatory capital requirements based on internally developed risk 
models.  As banks develop their proprietary models, the credit derivative market will be the key 
avenue by which a bank will be able to implement credit portfolio maximization techniques and 
customize a bank’s credit exposures in order to minimize the amount of regulatory capital 
needed, and maximizing a bank’s return on equity.   
 
Basle II is a paradigm shift in credit risk management with significant implications for the 
banking industry.  Besides the managerial issues of credit modeling, and rethinking credit risk 
systems, there is the potential for the banking market to split into those institutions that can 
successfully repackage and reform their credit portfolios through the credit derivative markets 
and those institutions that may have not have the level of expertise or sufficient capital market 
liquidity to do so to the extent desired.  As (Leander, 2003) quotes one Canadian bank 
professional, “There are a lot more tools out there than there used to be, but there still aren’t as 
many as we’d like, particularly in the Canadian market and for Canadian names.  It is not a very 
deep credit market and not a very deep capital market, which makes it difficult to do a lot of 
things that can be in the US market.”  The ability to accurately model credit exposures and to use 
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the credit risk transfer markets to maximize portfolio compositions will be key competitive 
factors for banking institutions.    
 
III   Managerial Implications of Credit Derivatives 
 
While the structural implications of credit derivatives have started to be explored by the 
academic community, the managerial implications have been relatively ignored.  (Rizzi, 2003) 
provides one of the few overviews of the managerial issues.  Rizzi presents a risk framework that 
centres on the pricing, legal, credit and liquidity risks that coming with being an active 
participant in credit derivative trading.   
 
In an earlier paper, (Nason, Cromarty and Maglic, 1998) provide an overview of the 
management structure decisions that need to be in place for the creation of a credit derivatives 
trading operation.  In their paper they examine the functional characteristics need for a trading 
operation and develop a grid analysis of how these characteristics match up against the existing 
pockets of functional expertise in other areas of a bank.  They consider four different areas of a 
bank where the credit derivatives trading function could exist; within the portfolio management 
group, derivatives group, loan syndication and trading group, or as a stand alone credit derivative 
unit.   They put forward a set of necessary functional characteristics, namely; back office, 
regulatory and documentation, pricing and trading, marketing and distribution and credit 
analysis.  
 
As already mentioned, there are several uses of credit derivatives that make them attractive to a 
financial institution.  However each of these uses can be broken into two main categories; credit 
derivatives as a product and credit derivatives as a tool.  The characteristics of credit derivatives 
as a product is that the bank is considering the credit derivatives operation to be a profit centre in 
its own right, while as a tool, the credit derivatives is an end to a means.   
 
Examples of using credit derivatives as a product would be; structuring assets for clients such as 
other banks or for the bank’s investor base, proprietary trading or credit derivative fund 
management.  Likewise, examples of credit derivatives as a tool would include; loan portfolio 
management, credit exposure management, regulatory capital management and economic capital 
exposure management.   
 
With credit derivatives as a tool, the financial institution is using the market as a means for profit 
maximization, whereas with using credit derivatives as a tool, the focus is generally on loss 
minimization or facilitation of profits through another banking activity (such as reducing an 
exposure limit to an existing client so another loan can be granted within lending limits).  These 
different activities have significantly different risk implications and also present differences for 
the level of expertise needed to utilize the market successfully to meet their objectives.  
Additionally, many of the key success factors for credit derivatives as a product, have little 
impact on the ability of a financial institution to successfully use credit derivatives as a tool. 
 
Table 1 lists the major issues previously discussed and breaks them down on the basis of their 
importance to a bank that is using credit derivatives as a tool versus an institution that is using 
them as a product line. 
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Some of the key success factors for using credit derivatives as a product would be the marketing 
expertise - the ability to successfully trade credit and to source counterparties.  These are all 
skills that are necessary for any type of credit trading, whether it is bond trading or secondary 
loan trading and syndication.  In addition to these skills, a key expertise would be the ability to 
model prices and risks, and to have the necessary informational technologies in place to measure 
and manage these competitive factors.  Finally, to mitigate liquidity risks, and to source trading 
partners, a critical attribute for a bank using credit derivatives as a product would be the 
marketing or distributional capability of a competent and knowledgeable sales force. 
 
The key success factors for using credit derivatives as a tool however are quite different.  In this 
situation, the credit derivative is used as a means, not as an end, and thus the comparative 
advantages required in the credit derivative market are diminished and less critical.  The key 
success factor for successfully using credit derivatives as a tool is to be clear about what the 
objectives of any transactions are and what the basis risks are between the credit derivative 
products used and the objectives. 
 
Examining the OCC survey data (OCC 2005), it is clear that there is a dichotomy between 
banking institutions in the degree of use of credit derivatives.  As stated earlier, there is a 
significant difference between the amount of credit derivatives activity between the top 5 credit 
derivative banks and all other banks combined with the top 5 banks having 96% of the usage.  
This is suggestive of the dichotomy between banks that are using the instruments as a product, 
(the top five banks) and the remainder of the banks who for the most part are using the 
instruments as a tool.   
The credit risk from credit derivatives is analogous to the market risk of other products or 
services that the bank offers.  Analysis of credit risk is a strength of banks that deal with 
corporate credits.  The difference with credit derivatives is that the market value of the portfolio 
can be altered not only by credit events, but also by the market’s perception of changing 
probabilities of future credit events.  
 
A bank that is using credit derivatives as a product line will have credit risk as a competitive 
factor.  The bank’s ability to gain market share and transact successfully will depend on its 
ability to manage and trade credit risk.  This requires market knowledge, including where credit 
risk can be sourced or places (bought or sold), as well as an ability to sense changes in market 
direction.  This implies a much more dynamic approach to credit risk management than is 
traditionally done in a bank setting. 
 
A closely related risk to credit risk, is modeling risk.  A bank that is planning to trade credit 
derivatives will essentially have their profits being a function not only of their trading skill, but 
also of their modeling skill.  While modeling skill is also important for banks that use credit 
derivatives as a tool, it will mainly affect their negotiation skill in transacting and for the most 
part simply affect bid-ask spreads that it pays on its transactions.  Credit derivative pricing is still 
a proprietary field, with resultant rewards for those that get it right and penalties for those who 
get it wrong.   
 
The human resources issue is another component.  The market is still relatively young, and as 
such the number of experienced practitioners is still relatively small.  Complicating the issue is 
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that, on the surface at least, credit derivatives are very simple products to understand, but they 
are very subtle in their unintended consequences.  As the instruments become higher in value to 
the bank, the requirement for more experienced and skilled personnel increases. 
 
Related to the human resource issue are the informational technology requirements of credit 
derivatives.  If a bank is using credit derivatives as a tool, then it is likely that most credit 
derivative instruments can be added into the existing IT credit management system relatively 
easily – for example posting the credit derivative as a loan substitute.  However, this band-aid 
solution is obviously inadequate for a market maker in the products. 
 
A final, and critical strategic decision for all banks using credit derivatives, is the role of the 
corporate banker, who traditionally was a bank’s first line of credit risk analysis and main credit 
risk structurer.  It is not inconceivable that some institutions would argue that the collective 
analysis of the credit derivative market is more valid and accurate than the analysis of any single 
banker or banking institution (ignoring informational asymmetries).  Then the logical step would 
be to treat traditional credit products as market priced commodities, and market and manage 
them as such.  This has far-reaching implications for the monitoring role of corporate bankers 
and banks, and is not dissimilar to the trend of banks relying on credit scoring rather than the 
perception of the local banker of the integrity of a retail loan applicant. 
 
 
IV   Conclusions 
 
In this analysis we have outlined the major challenges that the introduction of the credit 
derivatives market is bringing to the banking industry.  Banks that correctly leverage the 
capabilities of this market will gain competitive advantages in terms of their ability to source and 
maintain their corporate banking clients and from more efficient management of economic and 
regulatory capital.  For these and other reasons, mastery of credit derivatives is a strategic 
imperative for banks. 
 
In his paper we illustrate that there appears to be a dichotomy of the importance of the risk issues 
for the management of credit derivatives.  We therefore argue that banks need to choose whether 
credit derivatives will be used as a tool for credit management, or as a profitable product line. 
 
Further study into the analysis of best practices in the field, particularly with those banks that are 
acting as market leaders is needed.  Additionally empirical evidence into the practical roadblocks 
that seem to be limiting more banking institutions from participating in this market is will shed 













Credit Derivative Managerial Issues 
 
Comparison of Issues for Banks Using Credit Derivatives 




Risk or Issue 
 
CDs as a Tool CDs as a Product 
Credit Risk Exposure is mitigated by 
underlying instruments 
Competitive factor 
Modeling Ability Marginal cost issue Competitive factor 
Liquidity Risk & 
Distributional Capabilities 
Minimal  Competitive factor 
Transaction Risk 
(Basis risk, negotiation risk) 
Important Significant due to number of 
transactions 
Operations  Competitive factor 
Human Resources Relatively minor Competitive factor 
IT Requirements Possible add-in to existing 
credit systems 
Competitive factor 
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